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On January 25, 2011, the world’s attention was transfixed by Egypt. The people took to
the streets in a series of demonstrations and marches to protest the long-time reign of President
Hosni Mubarak and demand his immediate resignation. While the protests started out as peaceful
acts of civil disobedience, the Mubarak government’s response was not. Police and security
forces used conventional techniques such as tear gas and water cannons on the protesters, before
turning to terror tactics such as snipers, live ammunition, and thugs and criminals who terrorized
the people. A couple days into the uprising, Mubarak deployed the army, but they were
welcomed by the protesters and did not interfere in confrontations between the police and
protesters. After abolishing his cabinet and making several other moves to try to hang onto
power, it was finally over for Mubarak.
Fourteen days after the uprising began, Mubarak stepped down turning power over to the
military, ending 30 years of his authoritarian rule and beginning a period of uncertainty that left
the world questioning: will Egypt be able to transition to a democracy with free and fair
elections, political parties, and an actively involved civil society or will it be drawn back to the
world of authoritarian regimes?
The Road to Revolution
Revolutions do not happen by chance and Egypt is no exception. They are the
culmination of years of injustices and mistreatment by the regime, as well as, events that serve as
a catalyst for change. In the case of Egypt, revolution was the result of repression and
mistreatment by the regime and finally a spark of hope by events happening in surrounding
countries and the people of Egypt ready to through off the old regime and start a new, democratic
era.
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Mubarak ascended to the Presidency after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat by
radical Islamic members of the army in 1981 and has been consolidating power ever since. The
first move Mubarak made to tighten his hold was to declare a state of emergency and the laws
under this state of emergency have been in place since 1981. Under the state of emergency the
President of Egypt “has been able to institute measures of criminal law which… limit procedural
safeguards, through, for instance, referral of cases to military courts…broadening the scope of
what is considered ‘criminal’ so as to place many people at risk of being prosecuted/
persecuted.” 1 More specifically, the state of emergency created laws under which the security
forces have extended powers, censorship is legalized, people can be detained without being
charged, non-approved political organizations and any form of anti-government activity is
banned.
During his Presidency, Mubarak used the provisions of the emergency law to persecute
the Muslim Brotherhood and other rivals such as Ayman Nour that he deemed to be political
threats. In 1983, during the first Parliamentary elections of his Presidency, Mubarak changed the
election laws and the new law “confined activism to legal political parties, thus excluding
independent candidates from standing,” 2 as well as, all Islamist groups. This new law enabled
Mubarak to secure a large victory for his own National Democratic Party in the People’s
Assembly and control who participated in the elections. One party that was able to participate
besides the NDP was the New Wafd Party, which never gained a large amount of seats and did
not have the organizational structure or popular support that made it appear as a threat to the
regime.
1

Allain, Jean. (2004). International Law in the Middle East: Closer to Power than Justice. England: Ashgate
Publishers. Pg. 205
2
Zahid, Mohammed. (2010). The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis: the Politics of Liberalisation
and Reform in the Middle East. New York: Tauris Academic Studies.
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The antagonisms that helped fuel the revolution were the country’s growing gap between
the rich and poor and the growing control of police that exacerbated the problems that Egyptian
citizens faced. Education has played a large role in the growing inequality gap. In the 1970s and
1980s there was a reappearance of private schools and foreign universities which helped to
exacerbate the split in Egyptian society between those who could afford to send their children to
private schools with a modern educational curricula and those who relied upon the free education
provided by the Egyptian state. Those educated in private schools and universities were more
likely to find higher paying jobs and made up the wealthier part of society whereas those with a
public education background had to work harder for the same opportunities. Many Egyptians
faced increasing frustration in finding a job or taking jobs that were below their skill level, as
well as, a high level of unemployment.
Another irritant that fueled the people’s anger were the actions of the police forces and
the government turning a blind eye to their actions. This anger was brought to the forefront with
the death of Khaled Said, a young, Alexandrian businessman in June of 2010. Khaled Said was
beaten and died while in police custody, after posting a video online of police officers sharing
the remnants of a drug bust. 3 His torture and murder was not the first of its kind, but due to the
fact he was killed in public, the media attention his death received, and the fact that he was a
middle class citizen people took interest in his death because it brought forth the idea that no one
was safe from the police and security forces. Initially, the police tried to frame Khaled Said as a
drug dealer who died of an overdose, but after public opinion mounted against the police, the two
police officers were charged with illegal arrest and excessive use of force rather than murder and
the trial has continuously been postponed. This was yet another incident of police brutality.
3

(2010). Egypt Police in Brutality Trial Over Khaled Said Death. BBC News. Retrieved October 2011, from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10773404
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According to Human Rights Watch “Egyptian security forces, particularly State Security
Investigation (SSI) … have been permitted to operate in a lawless manner. Human rights abuses
by these forces include arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, and torture of suspects during
interrogation.” 4 The continued abuses by the regime such as torture, unlawful detention, the
murder of Khaled Said and other issues such as Mubarak’s attempt to hand power over to his
son, Gamal, and the decline of the economy helped to fuel anger against the government and
largely contributed to the January protests and revolution.
The upheaval in Tunisia in late 2010 and January 2011 also helped to spark the
revolution in Egypt. Political protests started in Tunisia after a young man named Mohammed
Bouazizi, set himself on fire after being humiliated by a policewoman and because of the
desperation he felt at not being able to make a living and care for his family. His act highlighted
the desperation felt by many Tunisians who were frustrated with living conditions, police
violence, rampant unemployment, and a lack of human rights. Bouazizi’s death served as a
trigger and brought Tunisians into the streets protesting and when the police reacted harshly
against the protestors, it sparked a revolution in Tunisia and also helped to inspire the events in
Egypt. After almost a month of continued protests, Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
fled the country and was eventually granted asylum in Saudi Arabia. The case of Tunisia showed
that it was possible for a popular uprising to oust a long-serving dictator and give the promise of
real change and a democratic transition.
Protests began in Egypt on January 25, 2011, after being organized through social
networking sites, with thousands of Egyptians taking to the streets of Cairo around Tahrir Square

4

Human Rights Watch, Egypt: Hostage-Taking and Intimidation by Security Forces, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1995, available
at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Egypt.htm
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and in other cities around the country. They gathered to protest the high levels of poverty,
corruption, and unemployment that had been increasingly felt in the country. Over the coming
days, the protest gained momentum and protestors clashed with security forces before the army
was deployed on January 28 and tens of thousands of people joined the protests after Friday
prayers. These events caused Mubarak to sack his cabinet in an attempt to appease protestors and
two days later he appointed a vice president for the first time in his 30-year rule. January 31,
spelled the beginning of the end for Mubarak when the army announced that they recognized the
rights of the people and refused to use force against them. The stance of the army marked a
turning point because it showed that the military which helped give Mubarak his power would no
longer support his actions. Protests continued over the next eleven days with the number of
people in the streets growing to number in the millions. On February 11, 2011, Mubarak finally
ended his three decade rule and turned power over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
headed by Field Marshall Muhamed Hussein Tantawi.
Is Democracy Possible?
The popular uprising and resignation of Hosni Mubarak left the country in a state of
euphoria and hope, yet there were many uncertainties. The stability that the authoritarian regime
had provided was now gone and the future of the country is in the hands of the Egyptian people
with the guidance of the military. The situation Egypt found itself in was not unique, yet there
were few examples for it to follow. The most promising of these models is the case of Indonesia.
In 1998, Indonesia experienced civil unrest against the 32-year old regime of General
Suharto similar to what Egypt faced in January of 2011. The protests in Indonesia were fueled by
the Asian Financial Crisis and brought people into the streets to protest how the government
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handled the situation and other abuses by the authoritarian regime. The protests in both countries
were started by young people using new internet tools and once they took hold, the protestors
were not to be satisfied until the dictator was out of power. Indonesia is also similar to Egypt in
the fact they both have majority Muslim populations and a military that was unwilling to harm its
people, preferring to remove the regime from power and assist in the transition. Indonesia also
leaves Egypt with a number of things to keep in mind from their own transition to a democracy.
The need for a clear timeline under which new elections will be held is crucial to a stable
transition. The people need to know when they will be able to start determining their own future
and when the transitional authority will be out of power, yet they need to be patient and realize
that democracies are not built over night. Indonesia is a promising model for Egypt, but the
Egyptian people will need to carve out their own future.

5

Democracy cannot exist in a country where the people are unwilling to take charge of
their destiny and the will of the Egyptian people is strong. They have made tremendous strides in
overturning an authoritarian regime, but they will need to remain vigilant to prevent another
faction from gaining power. This vigilance can be demonstrated by reforming their current
political institutions, carving out a distinct, limited role for the military, developing a diversified
and market-oriented economy, and having a vibrant civil society.
Political Institutions
Every democracy needs political institutions in order to function and Egypt has a long
history of democratic practices and institutions dating back to the constitution of 1882. The 1882
Constitution organized how delegates are elected to the National Assembly and placed
5

Brooks, Karen. (2011). Indonesia’s Lessons for Egypt. In Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved March 3, 2011
from http://www.cfr.org/region/indonesia/ri292
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restrictions on the authority of the Khedive (leader/governor of Egypt at the time). Shortly after
the 1882 Constitution was put in place, Egypt was brought under British control and the
provisions of the constitution were suppressed. Egypt remained under British control until 1922
when they regained their sovereignty and the following year the 1923 Constitution established
Egypt as a constitutional monarchy. The 1923 Constitution drew inspiration from the Belgian
Constitution and included provisions for freedom of expression, religious freedom, and property
rights. The constitution also provided for two houses the Senate and the National Assembly, and
the government was responsible to the National Assembly, but the King still retained the most
power and had the authority to abolish parliament. The 1923 Constitution was followed by the
1930 Constitution which increased the powers of the King and reduced the role of Parliament,
and the 1956 Constitution which changed the country from a constitutional monarchy to a
presidential system before the current constitution was established in 1971. 6
Due to its long political history, Egypt has political institutions in place that could
support a democracy if the corruptions they have experienced in recent years are removed and
they can function to their fullest potential. The Egyptian constitution written in 1971 created a
strong executive branch, a bicameral legislature, and a judiciary based on Napoleonic Code.
The executive branch is comprised of the President, Prime Minister, and Cabinet, under
the 1971 constitution. The president is selected by a two-thirds majority of the Parliament and is
confirmed by the people in a popular referendum to a renewable six-year term. The president
then has the power to appoint the vice president, prime minister and cabinet. The president is

6

Kiziltoprak, Suleyman & Nakip, Tahir. Egyptian Constitutions from National Sovereignty to Individualistic
Liberty. Retrieved December 20, 2011 from http://www.ordaf.org.tr/egyptian-constitutions-from-nationalsovereignty-to-individualistic-liberty.aspx
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also the chair of the National Security Council, which controls defense and military policy. 7 The
1971 constitution tries to dispense power by giving the prime minister considerable power in the
day-to-day running of the government and in the domestic policy arena, but this power was
greatly reduced under Mubarak as he fought to keep the prime minister and other cabinet
positions under his close supervision and influence, 8 as well as, consolidate power in general.
Mubarak consolidated his presidency through rigged elections which gave his own National
Democratic Party (NDP) a majority of seats and by persecuting those who spoke out against his
rule or posed a threat to his power such as in 2005 when opposition leader Ayman Nour was
jailed on trumped up charges of forging signatures on a petition to register his political party,
Ghad (tomorrow). Another way Mubarak stayed in control was by not appointing a vicepresident, so that he would not endorse someone else who might become more popular than him
and left him free to groom his son, Gamal, to possibly succeed him as president. Mubarak also
maintained tight control over his cabinet which was displayed when he promptly dismissed
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif and his cabinet on January 29, 2011 in an attempt to appease
protestors, only to replace the prime minister with another close ally, Ahmed Shafik.
The power enjoyed by the executive, in particular the president of Egypt, is already
facing reforms under the interim government headed by Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein
Tantawi. A referendum held on March 19, 2011 had several provisions in regard to the
presidency. It changed the length a president can serve from a six-year term with no term limits
to a four-year term with a limit of two terms. The referendum also makes it easier for a candidate
to run for President. A candidate now has to collect 30,000 signatures from fifteen provinces or

7

Sorenson, David S. (2008). An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy,
Politics. United States: Westview Press pg. 240
8
Sorenson, David S. pg. 241
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thirty members of the legislature or be nominated by a party holding one or more seats in the
legislature, 9 a drastic change from the previous laws where a president was chosen by two-thirds
majority of Parliament followed by a popular referendum. The provisions in the March 19, 2011
referendum, the first free referendum to take place in the fledgling democracy, were approved by
77.27% with 41.2% of registered voters participating. 10 This referendum was one small step
towards rebuilding the executive branch and election laws of Egypt and making them better able
to support a democratic country.
The Egyptian Parliament is a bicameral legislature with the People’s Assembly serving as
the lower house and the Shura Council, as the upper house of Parliament. The People’s
Assembly has 454 seats with 444 of them being popularly elected. A 166 of the members are
elected by majority vote through a two-round system of elections to serve a five year term and
332 of the members are elected through a proportional representation system to serve a five year
term. Each district has two seats with one of those seats being reserved for a worker or farmer. 11
The People’s Assembly also has ten seats whose deputies are appointed by the President and 64
seats that are especially reserved for women. Although the members of the People’s Assembly
are elected for a five-year term, the Assembly may be dissolved earlier by the President. The
President should not have this sort of power over the People’s Assembly and the law should be
changed in the coming months to make the legislative and executive branches more equal and to
provide for a system of checks and balances to prevent future presidents from abusing their
power.

9

(2011). Country Profile: Egypt. Retrieved October 24, 2011 from Election Guide Web site:
http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=65
10
(2011). Election Profile: Egypt. Retrieved October 24, 2011, from Election Guide Web site:
http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1929
11
http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=65
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The People’s Assembly has the power to draft laws and to draft, present, and approve the
General State budget, since the constitution specifically states that the plan of economic and
social development needs to be approved by the People’s Assembly. The budget must be
approved by a majority of the Assembly in order for it to be official and for any monetary
transaction to occur. 12 The People’s Assembly is also divided into eighteen different standing
committees that help the Assembly to carry out its monitoring and legislative duties.
The upper house of Parliament is the Shura or Consultative Council and is composed of
264 members, 174 of whom are directly elected through majority vote for a six-year term and 88
are appointed by the President and can be replaced at his discretion. The Shura Council does not
have as much power as the People’s Assembly and serves more as a body to be consulted when
there are issues relating to proposals for amendments to the articles of the Constitution, treaties
affecting Egypt’s territory or sovereignty, bills that are specifically referred to the Council by the
president, and international issues that are given to the Council by the president. 13
The Egyptian judiciary is independent of the other branches of government and is made
up of both secular and religious courts, as well as, a Supreme Constitutional Court, and other
specialized courts. The main role of the religious courts is to deal with problems that arise in
cases where religious guidelines are applied such as in marriage, divorce, or inheritance
(although these issues may also be considered in a secular court depending on the situation). The
Supreme Constitutional Court was established in 1969 and is the highest judicial power in Egypt.
It has jurisdiction to decide questions related to the constitutionality of laws and regulations,
settle jurisdictional disputes between other courts, and interpret laws issued by the Parliament
12

Wahab, Mohamed. (2006). An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal Research. Hauser Global Law
School Program. Retrieved form http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/egypt/htm#_The_Egyptian_Legal_System
13
Wahab, Mohamed. (2006) pg. 3
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and decrees from the president if there is divergence in their implementation. The judicial system
is based on French legal concepts and is influenced by Sharia law. 14 Theoretically, judges are
independent from the state and have judicial immunity, but during the Mubarak years they were
often puppets of the regime and could be influenced and corrupted. The court system will need to
be reformed under the interim and new governments of Egypt in order to root out the corruption
and provide a truly unbiased and independent judiciary.
Although the 1971 Constitution set the foundation for a democratic political system by
separating power between the judiciary, parliament, and executive, these institutions became
puppets of the Mubarak regime. The judiciary became a way for Mubarak to persecute and jail
his political opponents and suppress any rebellion by the people. The Executive was firmly in
Mubarak’s hands with the Prime Minister holding nothing more than a title and Parliament
served at the pleasure of Mubarak to “rubber stamp” his decisions. These institutions became
ways for Mubarak to consolidate his power and authority and their reform is essential in
safeguarding a new truly democratic Egypt.
Role of Military
Since 1952 when the military overthrew the monarchy through a coup d’etat, the military
has played a privileged role in politics. The first president of the republic General Muhammad
Naguib and all subsequent presidents have been from the upper echelon of the military and have
used their military careers to move into political positions. As president, Nasser, Sadat, and
Mubarak surrounded themselves with friends from the military and tied the military closely to
politics and the state. Under Sadat and his economic openness policy, a link between private

14

Wahab, Mohamed. (2006) pg. 3
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economic interests and the military developed. High ranking military officers and the economic
elite were able to mutually benefit from the “commissions game” which enriched the bank
accounts of military members and allowed for private businesses to get military contracts. 15 The
military also became involved in the country’s commercial and industrial sectors through the
National Service Projects Organization (NSPO), the Arab Organization for Industrial
Development, and other ventures. They had interests in the manufacture of weapons, electronics,
and consumer goods; infrastructure development; various agricultural businesses; as well as
interests in the service areas of aviation, tourism(developing hotels and resort complexes in
particular), and security which has made the Egyptian military one of the most important
economic entities. 16 The economic interests the military holds have also been able to resist
privatization plans over the last decade.
The military also has considerable political influence and played a major role in
convincing Mubarak to resign in February 2011. Since February they have been running the
country, but have been careful not to overstep their role and have not yet endorsed their own
candidate for president or Parliamentary elections, serving to guide the country towards
democracy, but not turn it into a military dominated country. If the military continues on this
path, it will serve as a stabilizing force for the transition to a democracy. The true test will come
when the military is asked to give up the power it has acquired and step back to allow a civilian
government to run the country and have a civilian in control of the military.
Economy and Development

15

Cook, Steven A. (2007). Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria,
and Turkey. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press pg. 19
16
Cook, Steven A. pg. 19
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The level of development in a country plays a large role in supporting a stable
democracy. Countries with higher levels of development are more likely to establish a
democratic government and better able to become consolidated democracies. The main index for
measuring development is the United Nations Human Development Index which issues Human
Development Reports each year that look at the level of human development through life
expectancy, adult literacy and enrollment in education, and standard of living measured by
purchasing power parity. The HDI is a good way to look at changes in a country over the course
of a number of years, as it ranks the HDI of each country by the level of development they have
such as very high human development through very low human development and by looking at a
number of different factors rather than just GDP, the HDI gives a more accurate representation of
a country’s true progress. 17
Since 1990 when the Human Development Index report first came out, Egypt has shown
improvement in the areas of life expectancy, average number of years of schooling, and GNI per
capita, as well as, overall progress. In 1990, the life expectancy in Egypt was 62 years and their
GDP per capita was $1,357 with a HDI score of .484 (0 being the worst and 1 being the best
score possible). 18 The HDI score of Egypt has risen over the past twenty years since the report
was first published. In 1995, 2000, and 2005 the scores were .523, .566, and .587 respectively. In
2010, Egypt was ranked as having medium human development and was ranked 101 out of 169
with a overall score of .620 a life expectancy of 70.5 years, average years of schooling being 6.5

United Nations Development Program (2010). Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth of Nations:
Pathways to Human Development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press
18United Nations Development Program (1990) Human Development Report 1990: Concept and Measurement
of Human Development. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press Table 1
17
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years, and GNI per capita at $5,889. 19 When compared with other Arab states, Egypt has a
slightly higher overall HDI score, higher life expectancy, and more years of schooling. Egypt
however, has a lower GNI per capita of $5,889 compared to the Arab state average of $7,861.
This could be due to the larger population of Egypt and the lack of oil wealth in comparison to
other nations in the region, particularly Gulf States.
The advancement of human development has been linked to democracy by political
theorists such as Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi who argue in their article,
“Modernization: Theories and Facts” that development leads to democratic stability and that
there is a threshold of per capita income at which the transition to democracy is more likely to
happen. They see development as leading to increased education, income, and urbanization, as
well as, a more active civil society and a more complex economy. These factors cause the people
to put more pressure on their leaders to democratize 20 and as the living conditions and standards
improve the people began to demand and hope for more, and act to try and achieve a better
future. As Egypt continues to development it increases its chances of transitioning to a
democracy and of solidifying and maintaining that democracy.
A growing and diversified economy is an integral part of any development strategy and is
necessary to help sustain a democratic country. Egypt is still classified as a lower middle income
country by the World Bank 21, but in the past decade they have made significant strides in
reinventing and reforming their economy. The cabinet that came in following the 2004 elections
introduced economic reforms that “simplified and reduced tariffs and taxes, improved
19 United Nations Development Program (2010). Human Development Report 2010: The Real Wealth of
Nations: Pathways to Human Development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press Table 1
20
Przeworski, Adam & Limongi, Fernando. “Modernization Theories and Facts”. (1997). World Politics. 49.2, 155183.
21
(2011). Egypt, Arab Rep. Retrieved November 1, 2011, from World Bank Web site:
http://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-republic
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transparency of the national budget, revived stalled privatizations of public enterprises and
implemented economic legislation designed to foster private sector-driven economic growth and
improve Egypt's competitiveness.” 22
Prior to the introduction of economic reforms in 2004, the growth of Egypt’s economy
had stagnated at about 3.2% real GDP growth in 2002 and 2003, which was well below the
average growth rate of African nations which was at 5.7% and 5.2%, respectively. There was
marginal improvement in 2004 and 2005, and the economy boasted a 6.8%, 7.1%, and 7.2% real
GDP growth rate in 2006, 2007, and 2008, which surpassed the average growth rates of African
nations. 23 Following the global recession in late 2008, Egypt’s growth rate fell but had
rebounded before being faced with a 55 day shutdown of the stock market because of the
revolution in early 2011. In order to continue on a trajectory of continued economic growth and
openness, economic reforms and re-structuring will need to be carried out by the new democratic
government.
Although economic growth was solid in Egypt for several years, there is still a need for
the economy to further diversify. As of 2009/2010, the services sector accounted for 48.5% of
GDP, industry 37.5% and agriculture 14% 24 with the country being heavily dependent upon
tourism, Suez Canal revenues, and oil and gas exports. Heavy reliance upon economic sectors
that are susceptible to international fluctuations could lead to instability in the future and a more
diversified economy would serve as a stabilizing safeguard.

22 (2010). Background Note: Egypt. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved September 2011 from
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5309.htm
23
(2011). Egypt. African Economic Outlook. Retrieved November 4, 2011, from
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/north-africa/egypt/
24
(2011). Egypt. African Economic Outlook. Retrieved November 4, 2011, from
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/north-africa/egypt/
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Along with diversifying the economy, Egypt also needs to put an end to the widespread
corruption in various economic sectors. According to the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index
which is issued by Transparency International, Egypt has a CPI score of 3.1 with zero being
highly corrupt and 10 having no corruption. 25
Political Parties and Social Movements
The development of political parties is critical to the democratization of Egypt. Under
Mubarak, political parties consisted of the New Delegation Party (al-Wafd), which advocated
abolishing the emergency law, promoting democracy, and solving social and economic problems
such as unemployment, housing, and the economy; 26 the Muslim Brotherhood, who was not
recognized as a legal political party under the Mubarak regime so their candidates ran as
independents and was a main opposition party that had a wide- reaching, well organized, support
base party; the Tomorrow Party (al-Ghad) which started as a splinter group of the al-Wafd party
by Ayman Nour and was immediately seen as a threat by the regime when Nour announced his
intention to run for president in the 2005 Presidential elections; 27 and the National Democratic
Party (NDP), Mubarak’s party, which dominated the political scene. Although political parties
were greatly limited under Mubarak both old and new parties now have the chance to shape the
future of the country. The NDP was dissolved by court order in April 2011 for the corruption and
election fraud they committed during the Mubarak era and although its members have formed
other parties, they do not have the political strength or support of the old NDP or other emerging

25

Transparency International. (2010). Corruption Perceptions Index 2010. Retrieved from www.transparency.org
(2011). Al-Wafd (Delegation Party). Retrieved December 21, 2011 from Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Web site: http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/al-wafd-delegation-party
27
(2011). Al-Ghad (Tomorrow Party). Retrieved December 21, 2011, from Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Web site: http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/al-ghad-tomorrow-party
26
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parties. 28 Parliamentary elections are in progress with elections for the People’s Assembly
completed and elections for the Shura Council which are scheduled to begin at the end of
January. Prior to the start of elections, Egypt saw the emergence of four main political party
alliances: the Democratic Alliance, the Egypt Bloc, the Islamist Alliance, and the “Completing
the Revolution” Alliance.
The Democratic Alliance is one such group and is made up of the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Freedom and Justice Party, al-Ghad al-Jedid, and al-Karama. There are several other small
parties in the alliance, but is dominated by the Freedom and Justice Party. The Democratic
Alliance was the first political bloc to be formed after the revolution and has faced internal
discourse since its founding with some groups leaving to join other blocs. Even with an internal
party rivalry, this bloc has done well in the polls due to the popularity and organizational
structure of the Muslim Brotherhood and has members contesting all seats in Parliament in the
upcoming elections. 29

The second main political party alliance is the Egypt bloc which is the main liberal
alliance and is made up of the Free Egyptians Party, the Social Democratic party and the
National Progressive Unionist party which got 50, 40, and 10 percent of the places on the party
lists, respectively. The Egypt bloc has 233 candidates participating in the upcoming elections in
46 constituencies. They also have a clear platform that focuses on “realizing the revolution’s
ideals of liberal democracy and universal citizenship.” 30 The bloc also emphasizes a “civil state”

28

(2011). National Democratic Party. Retrieved December 22, 2011, from Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Web site: http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/national-democratic-party
29
(2011). Al-Tahaluf al-Dimuqrati (The Democratic Alliance). Retrieved November 14, 2011 from Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace Web site: http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/26/thedemocratic-alliance
30
(2011). Al-Ketla al Masriyya (The Egypt Bloc). Retrieved November 14, 2011 from Carnegie Endowment for
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which entwines Islam within the political system and has endorsed the idea that Islam is to be the
official religion and the main source of legislation, but it does not want Egypt transformed into
an Islamic state.

The third alliance, the Islamist Alliance, consists of the Salafi al-Nour party, the Salafi alAsala party and the Building and Development Party. Salafi, is the idea of returning to the ideal
time of the prophet and first four caliphs, and the Islamist alliance represents the interests of
ideologically conservative Islamism and differs from other Islamist parties such as the Freedom
and Justice Party in the realm of foreign policy. The Islamist Alliance parties share a hardline
stance regarding the peace treaty with Israel and relations with western countries. 31

The fourth alliance is the “Completing the Revolution” Alliance, a new group made up of
the Egypt Freedom Party, the Egyptian Current Party, the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, the
Egyptian Liberation Party, the Equality and Development Party, the Revolutionary Youth
Coalition, the Youth Movement for Justice and Freedom, and the Union of Independent Farmers.
This alliance includes socialist, liberal, and moderate Islamist parties and will have 300
candidates running in the upcoming elections in 33 electoral districts. 32

Aside from the four main political alliances that will participate in the upcoming
elections there are also a number of social movements that are contributing the Egypt’s
developing civil society. These groups include organizations that have been around for decades
31
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such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as those that formed more recently like the Kifaya
movement which began in 2004 to protest Mubarak’s presidency and the possibility he could
transfer power to his son, as well as, the corruption and stagnation in the political system. Other
groups such as the National Association for Change and the April 6 Youth Movement have also
formed more recently helping to develop Egypt’s civil society. The April 6 Youth Movement
and the National Association for Change both helped to organize the protests in January that
fueled the Revolution. The presence of these movements in Egyptian society will help the
country to move forward as a democracy and shows the promise of a diverse and active civil
society.

Parliamentary elections began on November 28 and the third round concluded on January
3 with success. It is estimated that the first round of elections had around sixty-two percent voter
turnout or 8.5 million people 33 and the elections were not marred by fraud or corruption such as
ballot stuffing or arrests and harassment of candidates that were common under the previous
regime. Although elections for the People’s Assembly are over, there are still up and coming
elections for the Shura Council and the presidential election with a greater chance of violence as
poll results from other governates are released ahead of elections in other areas. In the first two
rounds of elections the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafi Nour
Party came in first and second respectively and will play a large role in the new parliament that
will be convened following the third round of elections in the middle of January.

Conclusions
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Egypt is currently at a precarious point. It is experiencing elections for the first time since
revolution swept the country in February 2011 and there is no guarantee at what the outcomes of
these elections will be. There are three main paths that Egypt may take in the years to come, but
none of these are guaranteed or can easily be varied.

The first possible path is one of optimism. Egypt has the tools that it needs to transition to
a democratic country. It has political institutions that can sustain a democracy with simple
adjustments and an active civil society with developing political parties and social movements.
However, the Egyptian people must take care to keep the military from holding onto power as
they have been making a move to do in recent weeks, by publishing a draft proclamation that
would keep the military in power and give them power over the drafting of the new
constitution. 34

The parliamentary elections currently taking place are crucial to the democratic transition
of Egypt, because the Parliament will be drafting a new constitution for the country and various
groups are competing to make their voices heard. If Egypt can make it through the elections in
the coming months and draft a new constitution they will be on a good path to democratization.
They must remain vigilant however, about the amount of control and influence the military has
in politics and be aware that the path to democratization is going to have bumps in the road and
that once it has an elected civilian government, that government is going to have to rise to meet
the challenges that face the country and inspired the revolution in the first place. Although the
democratic process may be filled with opposition and controversy, Egypt will be able to
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successfully complete the democratization process and become a country truly run by the wishes
of its people.

The second possible path that Egypt may be on is one that may leave the country in chaos
for years to come. At this point there is a struggle between the military that is still in many ways
tied to the old regimes and the political and social groups that are forming and/or working to
transition the country to a democracy. The military has shown a reluctance to give up too much
power and if they do not give the new parliament the power it needs there may well be violent
uprising for years to come until the country is either pulled firmly back into its authoritarian
ways or power and influence the military holds is finally broken.

Another factor that could leave Egypt in turmoil is the state of its economy and finances.
The revolution and uncertainty over the past months have hurt the tourism industry, which Egypt
relies heavily upon, as well as, lowering the level of business investment in the country. If Egypt
continues for years in a state of chaos and uncertainty, the economic situation will lead to further
decline which will also exacerbate problems within the country such as food shortages and
unemployment.

The third possible route for Egypt to take is one of middle ground. Elections will take
place and a new Parliament will come in, but the military will continue to fight to control the
civilian government. While the country will not slip back into authoritarianism, it may
experience corruption and a power struggle that could hamper its democratic and economic
development in the coming years. Social, political, and economic problems within the country
could get worse before they get better and protests by the people will continue. Also, Egypt
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could face the problem of the newly elected civilian government that is too divided and unable to
form coalitions to achieve a government that is able to address issues facing the country.

There is no guarantee of the path that Egypt will take in the coming months, since all
democratic transitions are fluid and face their own problems and successes. However, with the
political institutions, civil society, and will of Egyptian people to move their country forward
being strong there is reason to hope and believe that over the coming months and years Egypt
will transition and solidify into a democratic county controlled by the will of its people.
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